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AbsTrACT
This article advances the scandalous argument that we live in a post-social class modernity, 
and that the perpetual reinvention of class as the key concept for understanding social 
inequality is untenable. Class is not only a zombie concept but also an ideology that reflects 
a set of normative attitudes, beliefs and values that pervade sociology. Its starting point 
is that, sociology, once adept at imagining new ways to interpret the world, has become 
a subject field that wants to claim a radical space for itself while simultaneously relying 
on outworn theoretical frameworks and denying the work radicals do. 
 The article begins by suggesting that the problem of class has its roots in the deep struc-
ture of sociology. Taking its cue from Jacques Rancière’s classic study The Philosopher and 
His Poor it develops the argument that if class was once upon a time the fundamental issue 
in the study of social inequality, today sociology urgently needs an alternative cognitive 
framework for thinking outside this paradigm which it uses to open up a critical space 
for its own intellectual claims rather than reflecting society in the round. After arguing 
that we a living at the ‘end of Class’, the critique explores the limits of the work of Pierre 
Bourdieu, who has replaced Marx and Weber as sociology’s key theoretician of class. It is 
argued that in Bourdieu’s sociology, contentment is permanently closed to ‘the working 
class’ that thumps about like a dinosaur that survived extinction, anachronistic proof of 
the power and privilege of the theorist and his sociology rather than proof of the useful-
ness of his ideas. The key to understanding the limits of this interpretation, it is argued, 
is that it assumes a ‘working class’ that has little or no agency. 
 It is subsequently argued that sociology and the bourgeois media are coextensive. 
The specific function of the bourgeois media-sociology hybrid is to provide ideological 
legitimation of class inequality and of integrating individuals into sociology’s interpreta-
tion of social and cultural life. Focusing on the work of two self-identified ‘working class’ 
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journalists who have successfully made the transition into the bourgeoisie and who seek 
solid validation of their new found status in the bourgeois media it is demonstrated that 
social inequality is neither expressed nor examined in a convincing way. Framing ‘work-
ing class’ worlds even more ‘working class’ than ‘working class’, the bourgeois media, at 
best, lay them bare for clichéd interpretation. Here the article argues vis-à-vis Quentin 
Skinner that words are not so much mere ‘reflections’ of the world, but ‘engines’ which 
actively play a role in moulding the worlds to which they refer. Drawing on Rancière’s idea 
of the partage du sensible (distribution of the sensible) it is argued thereafter that here 
thinking ends up as the very thought of inequality because by posing social inequality as 
the primary fact that needs to be explained the bourgeois media-sociology hybrid ends up 
explaining its necessity. 
 The final part of the article offers some suggestions about how to rethink social inequa-
lity after class, and it concludes with the observation that the predicament facing sociology 
derives not just from its theoretical limits but also from its failure to give social inequality 
human meaning and the people who suffer it the proper respect by acknowledging their 
own interpretations of their own lives.
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Introduction
As I write this article, interest in class is at an all-time high among Brit-
ish sociologists. It is once again fashionable to speak about social classes. 
For all the talk about being ‘poor’ in a globalized world or ‘multiple de-
privation’, social inequality in modern Britain is unthinkable, indeed, 
unimaginable, without an understanding and acceptance of three prem-
ises: the concept of class is sacrosanct to the debate, the underpinning 
theoretical ideas about class are to be found in the ideas of the founding 
fathers and the key sociologists who have inherited their mantle, and 
class belongs to sociology – and broadly speaking, most people concur. 
The concept might have been given intellectual credence by political 
economists in the first three decades of the nineteenth century (Bau-
man, 1985), but it was made famous by two of sociology’s luminaries: Karl 
Marx and Max Weber. Marx revealed the mechanisms of class and how 
they are greased with money and powered by capitalism and the captive 
spell of ideology, and Weber explored how they are oiled by status and 
with pretension. 
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This position is grounded in one further premise. The importance of 
class lies not in attempts to reconstruct the past but in understanding 
the present. The old distinctions between upper, middle and working 
class identified by Marx ostensibly no longer hold good, demanding that 
we replace these with five intermediate classifications – the ‘established 
middle class’, the ‘technical middle class’, the ‘new affluent workers’, the 
‘traditional working class’ and the ‘emergent service workers’ – book-
ended by ‘the elite’ and the ‘precariat’, the poorest, most deprived class 
which has the lowest economic, social and cultural capital (Savage et al, 
2015). The impetus for this shift in focus emerged from the Great Brit-
ish Class Survey, a collaboration between a team of academic sociolo-
gists, BBC Lab UK and BBC Current Affairs (Devine and Snee, 2015), which 
developed its key arguments by drawing on the sociology of Pierre Bour-
dieu. The obvious advantage of reprising talk of class – especially through 
a Bourdieuian theoretical framework – is of course that it enables us to 
capture the full spectrum of groups in society who share social positions, 
tastes, orientations, life chances, and so on, in a relational way. 
But there are also dangers, because we may be seduced into thinking 
that there is something essential about being, for example, ‘poor’ and part 
of the ‘traditional working class’ and the ‘precariat’. What is worse still, 
we often hear sociologists using such classifications carelessly, assuming 
that their readers have a perfectly clear idea what they mean. Yet when 
we examine closely the categories advocated by sociologists we discover 
enormous gaps in understanding – including conflicting and contradic-
tory claims. This problem is exacerbated when these are processed on 
the highest secular level, that is, through the media, which feeds society’s 
craving for all kinds of unifying platitudes. But what we have here, it 
will be argued in this article, are not only stereotypes of class, such as 
‘chavs’ and ‘bogans’, mass-produced by the ‘culture industry’ (Adorno 
and Horkheimer, 1944) and featured in the mass-circulated media, but 
clichés produced and featured in investigative journalism and broadcast 
media (namely though not exclusively the Guardian and the BBC and 
what I will for the purposes of the current discussion call the bourgeois 
media), which draw their authority from their reciprocal relationship 
with sociology. Thus when academic sociology and the bourgeois media 
collaborate, as with The Great British Class Survey, the presentation of 
twenty-first century social class divisions in an affirmative way is under-
mined by culturally and ideologically processed clichés – the ‘traditional 
working class’ and so on– which are legitimized through a form of critical 
journalism that embraces the idea of the artist as co-producer of authen-
tic knowledge who is, to quote Jean-Paul Sartre (1947: 121), ‘in principle, 
independent of any sort of ideology’, because the journalist operates 
outside the framework of the ‘culture industry’. What this observation 
 16 Tony BlaCkshaw 
suggests is not only that that words are not so much mere ‘reflections’ of 
the world, but ‘engines’ which actively play a role in moulding the worlds 
to which they refer (Skinner, 2002). It suggests too that it just might be 
the case that sociological and bourgeois media representations of class 
are largely coextensive but also to equal degrees clichéd. 
As Christopher Ricks (1980: 54) once said, the only way to speak about 
a cliché is with another cliché. Therefore we might ask, what concept 
‘could be more hackneyed than hackneyed, more outworn than outworn, 
more tattered than tattered’, than class? So it might be advisable to drop 
all talk of class in order to avoid confusion, ambiguity and vagueness and 
to prevent cultural and ideological misrepresentation. In other words, it 
is not only the dualism between the ‘culture industry’ and mass-circu-
lated media that we need to be liberated from but also what I shall call 
the bourgeois media-sociology hybrid, a totally bastard art-form, whose 
homogeneity corresponds with a typical scene persistently restaged by 
scholars since Plato (Rancière 2004). 
Yet the stock response to such an idea would surely be that it is at 
best utopian and at worst irresponsible since it would impoverish our 
ability to understand continuing social inequality and the pernicious 
divide between rich and poor that has been growing since the end of 
the 1970s. The problem with the received wisdom, however, is that it 
never reflects on the strengths and weakness of continuing to use class 
as a key sensitizing concept. Nor does it contemplate the limits of adopt-
ing a Bourdieuian theoretical framework, which it will be argued in this 
article is purely a sign of the approval of the importance of the power 
and privilege of the theorist and his sociology rather than proof of the 
usefulness of his ideas. But the flaws in Bourdieu’s sociology are only 
part of the problem. A deeper issue has to do with the craving for class 
itself, fixed in its form and stripped of the distortions of time, which 
in robbing certain individuals of agency and the capacity to act in the 
world – to do things in a way that is neither predetermined nor simply 
shot from the hip – does not so much demonize them and turn them 
into monsters, but worse still patronizes them and turns them into pets 
(Derrida 1990). 
It seems to me that social class is more an obstruction to sociology 
(and by default to political science) today than an aid. I do not mean to 
gloss over the importance of economic inequality or the critical contri-
bution that Marx and Weber made to sociology. But I think that class 
has come to occupy the position that Marx and Engels, in the Communist 
Manifesto, assigned to the bourgeoisie: once dynamic, emancipating and 
progressive, it has become a fetter on sociology. The complexity of the 
twenty-first century world is simply too complex to be captured in its 
nineteenth-century vision. The starting point of this article is that in the 
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twenty-first century assumptions about universal human experience 
have run up against their limits. As a critical response to this state of 
affairs, the article aims to transform our perception by proposing a new 
parallax around which we might understand social inequality. What it 
proposes in the following pages is reformulating the study of this topic in 
response to some key cognitive and social changes in human experience. 
The assumption of this article is that there is a paradox at the heart of 
sociology: although it is extremely critical of social inequality, it commits 
the cardinal sin of representing the ‘subjects’ of social inequality – ‘the 
poor’ generally but ‘the working class’ specifically – as having no social 
role other than to perform this social inequality as they endure it as their 
life (Rancière 2004). On top of this it is too often the case that the bour-
geois media-sociology hybrid treats individuals like hapless automatons 
who do not have any agency. The capacity of individuals to amount to 
more than the sum of a set of circumstances is ignored; the ability to 
make a choice is glossed over. What is forgotten in continuing to frame 
social inequality through class – like all other essential questions in the 
functionalist epistemic that underpins this bourgeois media-sociology 
hybrid – is the enigma of freedom. 
The use of the term ‘epistemic’ (or cognitive frame) here is derived 
from Foucault’s conception of an ‘episteme’ which he develops in The Order 
of Things (1970). It is the view of the argument developed in this article 
that sociology is organized around a functionalist epistemic, a theoretical 
and empirical system of classification, in which words intersect with rep-
resentations to provide a prevailing order of knowledge (or discourse) for 
how things are connected in the overall subject field; this discourse de-
scribes the conditions under which what is taken to be ‘true’ knowledge 
is possible. Put simply, this epistemic is a model of functional equilibrium 
which has difficulty in analyzing social change. This functionalist epis-
temic is in this sense characterized by the watchwords ‘predetermined’ 
and ‘over-determined’ which, to paraphrase Foucault, are ‘conceived 
as both the guarantee of that knowledge and the limit of its expansion’ 
(1970: 35).
What would happen if we reversed this tacit assumption? What if we 
observed ‘the poor’ like everyone else in the twenty-first century as indi-
viduals of singularity in their endeavours to become artists of life in the 
first place? What if we assumed that the twenty-first century is a world 
in which we are able to dissolve old social forms (read: social classes) and 
replace them with new ones: all kinds of habitats, social networks, social 
spacings and social arrangements where we find new equilibriums. We 
could then see every phenomenon in people’s lives from a parallax view 
and, contrary to sociology as the fait accompli study of completed works, 
we could develop an understanding human life as a powerful force of self-
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realization and democratization, a veritable ‘theatre for the equality of 
opportunity’ (Rosanvallon, 2013) that makes it possible to engage in the 
kinds of practices that shape individuals’ lives. With an analogous ma-
noeuvre, we could likewise unpack the art of living when it is no longer 
only pursuit but when has also become an arrival, a new kind of ‘home’ 
for all of us people from somewhere else. 
Whether we call this the ‘art of living’, ‘individualism of singularity’ 
(Rosanvallon, 2013), ‘self-transformation’, ‘the care of the self ’ (Fou-
cault, 1986), ‘self-constitution’ and ‘self-assembly’ (Bauman, 1992), 
‘self-design’ and ‘virtuoso asceticism’ (Sloterdijk, 2013), ‘freedom’ or 
simply ‘empowerment’ is purely a matter of personal judgement. The 
assumption of this article is that its significance rests precisely on the 
opportunity it offers critical minded scholars to pursue the above kind 
of inquiry to a greater effect than as ever been done. To date sociol-
ogy has operated with the uncanny capacity for putting paid to such 
ambitions; it has overlooked the extent to which the ‘individualism of 
distinction’, understood by sociologists such as Pierre Bourdieu, became 
unexceptional and lost its elitist connotations in the final decades of the 
twentieth century, ushering in ‘a new phase in human emancipation, 
defined by the desire to achieve a fully personalized existence’ (Rosan-
vallon, 2013: 226). In so doing sociology has continued to wrap twenty-
first century life within a social inequality discourse and the veil of 
illusions associated with the concept of social class without which it 
cannot function properly. 
This has not only led to the domestication of sociology; the problem of 
the collusion of the idea of class with intellectual power has also become 
a problem. To paraphrase Nietzsche, there is a sentence which hangs 
over sociology: ‘I fear that we are not getting rid of class because we still 
believe in the grammar of Marx and Weber (and Bourdieu)’. Class in 
other words is an idea sociologists return to again and again despite the 
fact that its role as become symbolic rather than experiential. What was 
once a powerful sociological category has lost its original critical (and 
emancipatory) force. This is just as true of new interpretations of class 
as it is of old ones which, if they mean anything at all, probably convey 
nothing more than the idea that social groups continue to be differenti-
ated economically and relationally.
To develop an insight from Quentin Skinner (1980: 564). It seems to 
me that although sociologists as a group still to have ‘self-conscious pos-
session’ of class and continue to develop its ‘corresponding vocabulary’, 
a vocabulary which they use ‘to pick out and discuss the concept with 
consistency’, society as a whole does not. To paraphrase David Brooks 
(2003), most people today do not hold Marxist concepts in their heads. 
They ‘do not see society as a layer cake, with the rich on top, the middle 
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class beneath them and the working class and underclass at the bottom. 
They see society as a high school cafeteria, with their community at one 
table and other communities at other tables… All of this adds up to a ter-
rain incredibly inhospitable to class-based politics’.
This article argues that there is a need to revise the tacit assumptions 
sociology has about class in light of contemporary social and cultural 
transformations. Drawing the essence of its critique from Rancière’s 
(2004) important study The Philosopher and His Poor, it is argued that what 
this functionalist epistemic represents is less a compelling understand-
ing of social inequality than a scene of distribution (partage du sensible) 
– persistently restaged by scholars since Plato – in which marginalized 
groups (read: the ‘traditional working class’ and the ‘precariat’) are desig-
nated, delegitimized, assigned their place, and have their lives classified 
and tied down to a function, which inscribes them and their worlds into 
the dominant order of the things. This is the typical scene in sociology. In 
other words, this article makes the somewhat scandalous assertion that 
in order to open up a critical space for their own intellectual claims, so-
ciologists ultimately distort the lives of certain social groups. Under the 
auspices of sociology the life practices of marginalized social groups are 
circumscribed by two distinguishing factors: taste, on the one hand, and 
legislating power, on the other. The upshot is that judgement of taste is 
determined by the authority of sociology.
As Zygmunt Bauman explains at the beginning of his highly influential 
assessment of modern intellectual work: the legislators are those keepers 
of secrets who make authoritative ideological statements about the world 
and who have the power to make the ‘procedural rules which assure the 
attainment of truth, the arrival of moral judgement, and the selection of 
proper artistic taste. Such procedural rules have a universal validity, as to 
the products of their application’ (1987: 4–5). Drawing on Bauman’s ideas 
it is my view that in the twenty-first century, the authority of the legis-
lators understanding of social inequality is downgraded in importance, 
and so is the power of their legislating message, their way of communicat-
ing the truth about social inequality. This immediately entails the end of 
a certain form of ‘class’ analysis.
The critique offered below anticipates alternative scene which ar-
gues that there is actually another sequence of scenes, corresponding 
to twenty-first century life, where there exists a diversity individuals 
with ever more equipment for self-enhancement, which demand that 
we update our conceptual, empirical and normative understandings by 
embracing human life in the making, challenging functionalist distri-
butions. The analysis begins, drawing on the notion of the ‘end of class’, 
that understanding Class as sociology does is no longer useful, has come 
to an end. 
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The end of Class
It was the great American art critic and philosopher Arthur Coleman 
Danto in his compelling interpretation of the seismic shift in modern art 
in the final decades of the twentieth-century who first alerted us to the 
fact of the ‘end of ’ thesis:
We live at a moment when it is clear that art can be made of anything, and where 
there is no mark through which works of art can be perceptually different from the 
most ordinary of objects. This is what the example of (Andy Warhol’s) Brillo Box is 
meant to show. The class of artworks is simply unlimited, as media can be adjoined 
to media, and art unconstrained by anything save the laws of nature in one direction, 
and moral laws on the other. When I say that this condition is the end of art, I mean 
essentially that it is the end of the possibility of any particular internal direction for 
art to take. It is the end of the possibility of progressive development’ (1998: 139–40). 
In other words, what Danto is saying here is that the ‘end of art’ is not 
so much that we have witnessed art’s end, but the end of all legislating 
philosophies of art. To draw on this key insight, the idea that class has 
ended does not mean that it has died or that people no longer have any 
class. On the contrary. Nor does it mean something like class has come to 
the ‘end of history’. ‘End’ as I am using it here means something more like 
a finishing point. The ‘end of Class’ means that class in the functionalist 
sense of the idea has come to a conclusion. The ‘end Class’ means that 
class no longer has a grand narrative, a compelling story, anymore. After 
the ‘end of Class’, there is no such thing as ‘Class’ – there is only class.
There was once a time when the term ‘class’ meant something definite. 
If it is to continue to mean anything definite, then another term must 
be invented without holding to the functionalist epistemic. The study 
of social inequality is certainly essential to sociology, but the most im-
portant things relating to what people do in their lives are not derived 
from functionalist definitions. What is most important today is that it 
is the practices associated with the ‘art of living’, the ‘individualism of 
singularity’, ‘self-transformation’, ‘the care of the self ’, ‘self-constitution’, 
‘self-assembly’, ‘self-design’, ‘virtuoso asceticism’ and so on, which are the 
closest expression of the category of human life. Twenty-first century 
men and women are in no sense fixed. They might occupy very different 
places in the hierarchy of social institutions, but each and every one of 
them is born free – that is, contingent, and, indeed, endowed with bound-
less possibilities – and in this sense also equal. This means that they are 
individuals who have agency.
One conclusion that can be drawn from this observation is that the rea-
son that class is no longer special anymore is for the simple reason that it 
can be anything. At the risk of being tautologous, maybe it is simply the 
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case there simple too many definitions of class. My own understanding 
of what happened at ‘the end of Class’ is that it signaled a cause for cel-
ebration because human life had at last been liberated from the tyranny 
of Class, both for individuals and for itself. The day when class crossed that 
line was the day when human life became itself and freedom as a real 
possibility. 
To the extent that class continues to be used in sociology is only as 
a ‘zombie category’ which no longer has a compelling grip on reality. 
The way I am using this term here refers to the idea of the ‘living dead’. It 
was developed by Ulrich Beck (2002) as a response to the major epochal 
changes that have transformed the relationship between sociology, indi-
viduals and existing social formations and institutions. For Beck, zombie 
categories are essentially stock sociological concepts which, if they seem 
self-apparent, have in fact lost their conceptual and explanatory power. 
Drawing on Beck’s thesis it is possible to argue that after the ‘end of Class’, 
the study of class in sociology has become a kind zombie subject field that 
continues to stalk the living world, even though it has come to feel like 
a ghost from a different time.
For all the innovative studies sociology has produced over the years, 
this nineteenth century concept remains sacrosanct. To understand why, 
let us return to Foucault’s conception of ‘episteme’ once again. As David 
Macey (2004: 73) explains, as Foucault saw it, the body of knowledge pro-
duced within any episteme is organized around its ‘unconscious’ or doxa 
– the knowledge it thinks with but not about. This tacit knowledge is what 
underpins its ‘order of things’. In Foucault’s view then, every episteme 
operates with a set of rules of which its adherents are not consciously 
aware. The episteme under which sociology is organized foregrounds 
social inequality on the one hand, and a system of classification which 
assumes that rigorous theorization and empirical study into the social 
presuppose one another, on the other. It is my argument that, without 
really knowing it, sociology uses these same rules to produce in a circum-
scribed way the very diverse objects of twenty-first social and cultural 
life of which it speaks. 
Hitherto I have suggested that the knowledge produced in sociology is 
governed by what Foucault calls a ‘historical a priori’ which foregrounds 
certain tacit assumptions about how and in what ways people experience 
social inequality. Let me put it another way. Fundamental to sociology 
is the conviction that, however diverse are our social and cultural lives, 
these are destined to remain of a fundamentally certain order. So, in try-
ing to conceptualize social inequality, sociology must necessarily resort 
to certain modes of thought for ‘describing’, ‘representing’ and ‘speaking’ 
that in the nature of the case draw certain connections between different 
aspects of ‘reality’, and indeed derive their power precisely from the fact 
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that they are expected. Whether ‘described’, ‘represented’ or ‘spoken’, 
the discursive formation known as sociology must continue to produce 
certain effects that provide us with an integrated account of the ‘reality’ 
of social inequality. The further that process of integration continues, the 
more it can be taken to suggest everything inhering in a single common 
underlying ‘reality’, a functionalist equilibrium that is the source of all 
that is. This is the intuition that is common to sociology.
It is my view that we must necessarily resort to using some other new 
metaphors that draw unexpected connections between different aspects 
of reality, and indeed derive much of their power precisely from the fact 
that they are unexpected. Yet sociology carries on as if British society 
has remained the same as it was fifty or sixty years ago (depicted to fine 
effect in books such as Ross McKibbin’s (1998) magisterial historical study 
Classes and Cultures 1918–1951), ignoring the fact that, notwithstanding 
some continuities in social inequality, people’s lives have been radically 
transformed, which means that the ways in which they live their lives 
can no longer be seen merely through the distorting lens of a dated social 
class analysis. 
This does not mean that class is unimportant; quite the reverse. It is 
simply that we need to brush the history of second half of the twentieth 
century against the grain as it were to redeem, reconfigure and reinter-
pret social inequality in a different way. Asking if social class is real is like 
asking if money is real. Both questions are meaningless without a cog-
nitive frame. At the economic level of analysis, classes at the beginning 
of the twenty-first century are still real enough. But both socially and 
culturally the working-class worlds described in books such a McKibbin’s 
barely exist today – and haven’t since the end of 1970s. 
In this article we must try to account for the apparent insistence in 
sociology that continuity is more preferable to change. It is my view 
that by continuing to pose social inequality – particularly though not 
exclusively of class – as the primary ‘fact’ that needs to be explained 
with regard to social inequality, sociology has ended up explaining its 
necessity (Rancière 2004). This might appear a somewhat scandalous 
proposition; it is meant to be. As such, it demands a critical discussion. 
In the next part of the article I will consider two issues. On the one hand 
there is the massive legacy of Bourdieu, the social theorist of Distinction 
(Bourdieu, 1984), whose theories and concepts underpin twenty-first 
century sociological analysis of class (see Savage et al.: 2015); on the 
other is the bourgeois media-sociology hybrid, and in particular the 
way it reproduces ideologically processed assumptions about ‘the poor’ 
emanating from this sociology. Ideology is associated with systems of 
attitudes, beliefs and values that naturalize social inequality through 
false consciousness. In this way ideology always embodies particular 
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arrangements of power. As this article demonstrates, the function of 
ideology as it is being used here is associated with systems of attitudes, 
beliefs and values that naturalize social inequality through sociology 
which is used to uphold norms and perceptions, not by which ‘the poor’ 
actually live, but by which sociology requires them to live. Here then my 
aim is to give two illustrations of what happens when social inequality 
is presupposed. 
The sociologists and ‘their’ poor: Pierre Bourdieu
Let us begin with Bourdieu. His ‘theory of practice’ (Bourdieu 1977) as 
we have seen underpins the Great British Class Survey. What this demon-
strates is that to a remarkable extent he has become sociology’s key so-
ciologist. This is hardly surprising since throughout his academic career 
Bourdieu undertook numerous studies – taste, high culture, symbolic 
rivalry, education, sport, skholē – so as to raise some compelling ques-
tions relating to social inequality.
Like Adorno, Bourdieu is critical of the economic determinism found 
in the more unsophisticated versions of Marxism. His thinking requires 
that we move towards a more general theory of social inequality in con-
sumer-based societies where social classes are ‘united by the way they 
spend their money, not the way they earn it’ (Bauman, 1988: 36). In this 
sense, Bourdieu’s social theory of Distinction is an explicit attempt to 
understand the nature of social class and social class divisions in a com-
plex world in which production has largely given way to consumption. 
Accordingly, he offers what is essentially a treatise on taste. For Bourdieu 
(1984) social class, like gender and ‘race’, needs to be understood as much 
by its perceived existence as through its material existence in the classical 
Marxist sense. To make this synthesis he draws on a theoretical toolkit 
featuring the concepts of field, habitus and capital. 
Fields reflect the various social, cultural, economic and political arenas 
of life, which form their own microcosms of power endowed with their 
own rules. Education, leisure, sport and so on are structured in this way. 
Power struggles emerge in ‘fields’ as a result of the belief of social actors 
that the capital(s) of the field are worth fighting for. To draw on one ex-
ample, the question is not just whether Italian opera is superior to Chi-
nese opera, but also ‘the series of institutions, rules, rituals, conventions, 
categories, designations, appointments and titles’, which constitute the 
objective hierarchy of opera, ‘and which produce certain discourses and 
activities’ (Webb, Schirato and Danaher 2002: 21–22). Analogous to fluc-
tuations in the stock market, the ‘currency’ or rates of exchange attached 
to particular capitals in particular fields are also vulnerable to change as 
these are continually contested.
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In order to synthesize the relationship between the individual and 
society, or more precisely, social actors’ relationships with a highly differ-
entiated consumer world constituted by these fields of power, Bourdieu 
draws on Marcel Mauss’s use of the concept of habitus. Bourdieu (2000) 
suggests that the habitus is an embodied internalized schema which is 
both structured by and structuring of social actors’ practices, attitudes, 
and dispositions. The habitus also constitutes and is constituted by social 
actors’ practical sense of knowing the world and it is through their ‘feel 
for the game’ of the field in question – in our example the world opera – 
that they come to see that world and the position of themselves and oth-
ers in that world as unexceptional. Vital to understanding this ‘perfect 
coincidence’ is the idea of the social actor’s doxa values or ‘doxic relation’ 
to that field and world, which Bourdieu identifies with that tacitly cogni-
tive and practical sense of knowing of what can and cannot be reasonably 
achieved. In this sense, the habitus constitutes only an ‘assumed world’ 
captured as it is through the confines of the individual social actor’s ‘ho-
rizon of possibilities’ (Lane 2000: 194).
In any field the practices, attitudes, and dispositions which social ac-
tors both adopt and embody ultimately depends on the extent to which 
they can position themselves and their particular ‘endowment of capital’. 
For Bourdieu, a capital
is any resource effective in a given social arena that enables one to appropriate the 
specific profits arising out of participation and contest in it. Capital comes in three 
principal species: economic (material and financial assets), cultural (scarce symbolic 
goods, skills, and titles), and social (resources accrued by virtue of membership in 
a group). A fourth species, symbolic capital, designates the effects of any form of 
capital when people do not perceive them as such…The position of any individual, 
group, or institution, in social space may thus be charted by two coordinates, the 
overall volume and the composition of the capital they detain (Wacquant, 1998: 221). 
What this suggests is that ‘the profits of membership’ offered are not 
available to everybody in the same way. This is because, as Ball (2003: 4) 
asserts, the point of all ‘capitals’ is that they are resources to be exploited 
and it is their exclusivity in the battle for distinction that gives them their 
value. In other words, people who realize their own capital through their 
leisure interest in opera do so specifically because others are excluded.
Bourdieu explains this process through his theory of cultural capital 
which identifies the forms of value associated with culturally authorized 
consumption patterns and tastes. Bourdieu identifies three separate 
strands of cultural capital — (1) incorporated, which is seen as indistin-
guishable from habitus and confined to the embodied experiences and 
knowledge of class groups across the life span, (2) objectivated, which is 
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independent of individuals and located in material culture and its value 
in the market place, and (3) institutionalized, which is located within 
establishment structures, such as appointments, titles, awards and so 
on, and their implicit and explicit relations of power. Despite their dis-
tinctions, these different forms of cultural capital should be seen as co-
existing within specific cultural fields defined by their own institutions, 
conventions and dispositions. 
According to Bourdieu, social capital, like cultural capital, has two deci-
sive features: on the one hand, it is a tangible resource made by advantage 
of social networks, and on the other, it has a symbolic dimension, which 
contrives to hide networks of power woven into the fibres of familiar-
ity. In the event, Bourdieu’s understanding of capital suggests that it is 
related to the extent, quality and quantity of social actors’ networks and 
their ability to mobilize these, which is always governed by the mutual 
understanding that any given field is an arena of struggle and it is the bat-
tle for distinction that gives capital its qualities. The upshot of this ‘battle 
for distinction’ is that it ends up symbolically approving the interests of 
the most powerful e.g. opera, ballet, classical music etc. and disapproving 
those of the weakest groups e.g. shopping, sport, pop music etc. What this 
tells us is that the world in general is made up of different sites of sym-
bolic rivalry. As Skeggs (2009) argues, the battle for distinction in is also 
often accompanied with ‘a gaze’, or a ‘look that could kill’, that embodies 
a symbolic reading of who has and who hasn’t the right to certain kinds of 
cultural capital, and which makes those who are perceived as unworthy 
feel ‘out of place’. This is what Bourdieu calls symbolic violence.
One of Bourdieu’s major themes in this regard is people struggling 
with their own embodiment, with the fact of having bodies in the mod-
ern sense. If how a body looks makes some individuals happy, it can also 
make others unhappy with their bodies, particularly when they feel that 
they fail to match the social norm. This can persuade some individuals to 
pretend things are not as they are or encourage them to pursue leisure 
pursuits which will give them a better ‘look’. It can also lead some indi-
viduals to follow conventions which, while they complement some bod-
ies, must be stretched over others; this can also lead to a situation where 
those (deviants) who contravene the social norm are over-identified with 
and through their bodily ‘look’ and deportment. In other words, and as 
Bourdieu would say, violence is exercised upon individuals in symbolic 
rather than in physical ways. 
Symbolic violence is the non-physical, emotional violence which is 
exercised upon individuals with their complicit that plays a key role in 
underlining the socially reproductive nature of the status quo (Bour-
dieu, 1989). Individuals are represented as the reproducers of ‘objective 
meaning’ who do not, strictly speaking, know what they are doing that 
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what they do has more meaning that they know’ (Bourdieu 1977: 79). 
Symbolic violence works to ensure the reproduction of class and gender 
dispositions and the habituses most advantageous for maintaining the or-
der of things. In other words, symbolic violence is one of the tools which 
enables the activator class to impose a cultural arbitrary as an arbitrary 
power – it does this by making class and other inequalities seem both 
natural and necessary. In the event the most powerful groups in society 
maintain their positions in the social hierarchy not only with the aid of 
economic capital, but also the social and cultural capital embodied in 
their leisure lifestyles: a combination of earning power and superior 
taste. On top of that, the most vulnerable groups tend to be blamed for 
their own misfortune since it is presumed they lack that right social and 
cultural resources to determine their own lives, which in turn encour-
ages the superior ‘us’ to determine what is appropriate for the inferior 
‘them’ (Blackshaw and Long 2005).
Homo Bourdivinus: the arbitrary as necessity
In this regard Bourdieu’s sociology remains firmly within the Marxist 
tradition of foregrounding ‘structure’ at the expense of ‘agency’. This 
has led Jeffrey Alexander to argue that his ‘theory of practice’ is ‘noth-
ing other than a theory of the determination of practice’ (1995: 140). This 
observation has led Richard Jenkins to argue that Bourdieu’s sociology is 
reductionist, deterministic and tautologous since its overriding focus is 
on social stability rather than social change. ‘Objective structures… are 
somehow given as ‘cultural arbitraries’, which the actions of embodied 
agents then reproduce’ (1992: 82). Nowhere is this criticism more appar-
ent than in Bourdieu’s theory of habitus which he uses to attempt to tran-
scend the ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ debate in sociology. As Peter Sloterdijk 
explains, in typical acerbic fashion:
The habitus, then, is the somatized class consciousness. It clings to us like a dialect 
that never disappears, one that not even Henry Higgins would be able to drive out of 
Miss Doolittle. When Trimalchio, the freed slave who subsequently acquired wealth, 
tastelessly displays his wealth at his banquets, the members of the old elite recognize 
the typical slave in him. When Bourdieu, on the other hand, the grandson of a poor 
metayer and the son of a postman from Beam, rose to become a master thinker and 
dominate the ‘field’ of academic sociology in France, the thought of the ineradicable 
habitus of his class helped him to allay the suspicion that he had betrayed his origins 
through his career. From this perspective, the theory of habitus has the inestimable 
advantage of serving the moral reassurance of its author: even if I wanted to betray 
my own class, it would be impossible, because its absorption into my old Adam forms 
the basis of my social being (2013: 180–1). 
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What this suggests is that there is a paradox at the heart of Bourdieu’s 
sociology: although it is extremely critical of social inequality, its subjects 
have no social role in it other than to perform this social inequality as 
they endure it as their life. As Swenson explains, for Rancière, this leads 
to ‘a theory of the necessary misrecognition of social relations as the very 
mechanism of their reproduction’ (2006: 642). This tautology is impor-
tant for our purposes since it clearly identifies the limits of Bourdieu’s 
sociology. Not only is social inequality built into the deep structure of his 
sociology, but it also performs the brilliant feat of making ‘the poor’ feel 
ennobled while confirming their exclusion from the world of choice (see 
for example Bourdieu’s Magnus Opus The Weight of the World (Bourdieu et 
al. 1999)). My use of the term ‘the poor’ here is Rancière’s which works 
with the assumption that the history of Western thought is one in which 
freedom and the right to think are premised on situating and excluding 
those whose social role is perceived other than to think. In applying the 
term in this way I am also using it as a shorthand to include all those so-
cial groups who are in one way or another subjugated and/or excluded. 
It isn’t that Bourdieu’s respect for ‘the poor’ isn’t genuine, it is simply 
the case that his insights are not convincingly constituted of the differ-
ent situations in which social inequality occurs. To use our example of 
leisure once again, in a nutshell, the great sociologist of reflexivity thinks 
that the majority of ‘the poor’ do not have any time for leisure and he 
presumes that those who do are incapable of having any – well, any that 
doesn’t incite the kind of disapproving, puritanical look made corporate 
by the Frankfurt School, whose ghost lives on in Bourdieu’s sociology, 
grimly looking down and shaking its mocking head at those amongst ‘the 
poor’ ‘aspiring to reranking [reclassement] through [their] feats in the 
great simile industry of the new petty bourgeoisie: the manufacture of 
junk jewelry or sale of symbolic services; the commerce of youth leaders, 
marriage counsellors, sex therapists, advertising executives, or dieticians 
determined to create within people the symbolic need necessary for the 
enlargement of their market, hence for the reconquest of their inheri-
tance’ (Rancière 2004: 192–193).
Here the working class thumps about in a new consumer world like 
a dinosaur that survived extinction, anachronistic proof of Bourdieu’s 
sociology. He also imagines a sad working class flaunting their conspicu-
ous consumption, their unconscious misappropriation of the symbols 
their betters. Here Bourdieu produces ‘the poor’ without distinction and 
without any agency.
The upshot is that ‘the poor’ is simply an abstraction. In Bourdieu’s soci-
ology, life practices are understood through their necessary misrecogni-
tion. In his obsession with imposing his own grand narrative, Bourdieu’s 
ends up with a thesis of ‘the working class’ with neither the leisure to 
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think of itself in other ways (Rancière, 2004) nor alternative ways of 
thinking about social inequality other than those imposed on them by the 
theorist of Distinction. As Sloterdijk explains Bourdieu is thus unable to
grasp the individualized forms of existential self-designs. Bourdieu’s analysis nec-
essarily remains within the typical, the prepersonal and the average, as if Homo 
sociologicus were to have the last word on all matters. In a certain sense, Bourdieu 
parodies the analysis of the ‘they ‘ in Heidegger’s Being and Time from an inverted 
perspective. While human Dasein is, for Heidegger, ‘proximally and for the most 
part’…subject to the anonymity of the ‘they ‘, and only attains authenticity through 
an act of decisiveness, the authenticity of existence for Bourdieu lies in the habitus, 
over which a more or less random superstructure of ambitions, competencies and 
attributes of distinction accumulates. This reversal of the ‘they’ analysis follows al-
most automatically from agreement with the political ontology of practical thought, 
which states that the base is more real than the things that are superstructurally 
added. This would mean that humans are most themselves where their shaping 
through the habitus pre-empts them – as if the most genuine part of us were our 
absorbed class. The part of us that is not ourselves is most ourselves. The habitus 
theory provides a clandestine hybrid of Heidegger and Lukacs by taking from the 
former the idea of a self-dispersed among the ‘they ‘, and from the latter the con-
cept of class consciousness. It builds the two figures together in such a way that the 
pre-conscious class ‘in itself ’ within us becomes our true self. This corresponds to 
Bourdieu’s division of the social space into diverse ‘fields’ – in which one naturally 
finds no ‘ persons’, only habitus controlled agents who are compelled to realize their 
programmes within the spaces offered by the field (2013: 181–2).
What this suggests is that issues of critical self-reflection and authen-
ticity for ‘the poor’ remain largely unaddressed in Bourdieu’s work. What 
this also means is that his sociology is limited ontologically in the sense 
that it ignores that fact that all of us, notwithstanding our social back-
ground, are existentially individuals for whom being is itself also the 
performing of distinction. 
Building on this critique, Rojek and Blackshaw (2013) argue that the 
bearing of ‘generative principles’ (Bourdieu 1977) that produce and re-
produce the social practices underpinning choices in the contemporary 
societies are of a different order in the contemporary world than those 
suggested by Bourdieu. In other words, Rojek and Blackshaw call into 
question Bourdieu’s tacit assumption that social structures are deeply 
incorporated into individuals’ ‘dispositions’ in such a way we can antici-
pate what their leisure choices are going to be over time. As they point 
out, drawing on the work of Bauman, 
liquid modern consumers prefer to wear the more informal gear of habitat rather 
than the more regimental class uniform of habitus. Whereas habitus is uncompli-
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cated in the sense that it is relatively fixed because it is pre-determined by social 
class location, the habitat is ‘a space of chaos and chronic indeterminacy’… which is 
a schema of self-regulation subjected to competing and often contradictory mean-
ing-conferring claims that nonetheless appear equally contingent. The ontological 
status of liquid moderns is for this reason not one of ‘durably installed generative 
practices’ (Bourdieu, 1977), but of under-determination, liquefaction and rootless-
ness (Rojek and Blackshaw 2013: 553). 
The bourgeois media-sociology hybrid and its poor
In the course of their work, responsible journalists do many things, 
but the most difficult assignment in a under-determined liquid modern 
society is to explain social inequality in a language that does not resort 
to clichés of class – which as we have seen sociologists have not shown 
much interest in getting rid of. The trouble is – as I argued at the begin-
ning of this article drawing on the example of the Great British Class sur-
vey – journalists in the bourgeois media resort to sociology because they 
assume that it is, to quote once Sartre again, ‘in principle, independent 
of any sort of ideology’. One of the important cultural roles, perhaps the 
most important cultural roles performed by responsible journalists is to 
correct public conscience by revealing lies and telling sobering truths. 
But what happens when these journalists’ attempts to correct the public 
conscience not only collude with ideology but are also ‘out of joint’ with 
the social reality in our contemporary moment? In the next part of this 
article it will be demonstrated that it is not only the dualism between the 
‘culture industry’ and mass-circulated media that we need to be liberated 
from but also what I call the bourgeois media-sociology hybrid, a totally 
bastard art-form, whose homogeneity corresponds with the typical scene 
in sociology. 
A description of bourgeois media-sociology hybrid in action can be 
found in the writings of two journalists: Lynsey Hanley, author of the 
books Estates (2007) and Respectable (2016) and a Guardian journalist, and 
Édouard Louis, author of the novel The End of Eddy (2017a), editor of the 
academic book Pierre Bourdieu: L’insoumission en heritage (2016), and occa-
sional Guardian journalist, who are both devoted to revealing how social 
class continues to be socially produced and culturally defined, respec-
tively in Britain and France. I have chosen to discuss Hanley’s and Louis’s 
journalism (rather than offer a discussion of the relationship between 
sociology and the Great British Class Survey) for a particular reason. Both 
are especially interesting writers not just because they ply their trade in 
the bourgeois media but also for the reason they were themselves once 
upon a time of ‘the poor’ (that is they are both self-identified ‘working 
class’ individuals whose claim to fame is that they have made the tran-
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sition to the bourgeoisie), which means their social mobility can offer 
insights that get us even further than what we pick up from discussing 
the bourgeois media-sociology hybrid in a general way.
Social mobility from ‘the working class’ to the bourgeoisie through 
plying ones trade in bourgeois media is based on a tacit deal that comes 
with certain ‘strings attached’. In order to overcome the possibility of 
any disruption in the partage du sensible (distribution of the sensible) the 
new bourgeoisie – who are strikingly different from the old bourgeoisie 
and, yet interrelated; who converse with the old bourgeoisie and, yet ap-
parently have little in common – has to play its right and proper role in 
maintaining the status quo by raising themselves above the world from 
which they originated. 
But what is the distribution of the sensible? This is a world with 
an almost transcendent order. It has a structure. It has uniform re-
petitiveness. It is ruled by a centre and a hierarchy. It is the lack of 
confusion – the clarity and orderliness of what fits where – that is 
most important in any distribution of the sensible. A sensible world is 
one of coherence, of particulars, of relations, of belonging, of specific 
place, all of which exist in microcosm of the broader whole. In this 
world things have their appointed places. One way of characterizing 
a sensible world is to subvert the existentialist slogan, ‘existence pre-
cedes essence’. That is, ‘essence precedes existence’. People are divided 
into social divisions. Place, belonging to place, wholeness of self, tacit 
understanding of the world and the certainty of its continuation are 
all part of the process of life. A distribution of the sensible is a world 
of belonging. People have their appointed places and these are insepa-
rable from identities. Everything is interconnected. You can connect 
one thing to another because everything has its appointed place. In this 
distribution everything is ‘sensibly’ either altogether one thing or al-
together another; any compromise, any hint of contagion, jeopardizes 
its ontological certainty.
When the occasion demands, the distribution of the sensible, as Ran-
cière (2005) points out, resorts to ‘police’ power (la police), including the 
kind of sheer brute force that is inherent to all imperializing projects. 
This observation notwithstanding the concept as it used by Rancière 
refers not to the ‘police force’ as such (although it does involve formal 
authorization of the police force, judiciary, legal systems and prisons), 
but to the functional ordering of social reality that is responsible for the 
right and proper distribution of societal places and roles. The function 
of la police is to determine the field of intelligibility concerning the distri-
bution of the sensible by maintaining the symbolic power of all things, 
which obey ‘conventional’ rules of discourse. Put simply, the assigned 
role of la police is both absolute and totalizing and its function is to make 
 BriTish soCioloGy, The BourGeois MeDia-soCioloGy… 31
sure that the order of things – what is visible, sayable, doable, imagin-
able, and crucially, by whom – remains unambiguous. 
People might be divided but the distribution of the sensible is one 
where everyone sees, hears, feels and has the same understanding of the 
world, everything divisive melts away into an essence of equivalence – it 
is the affiliation of this essential inequality, each social group separate 
and different but in essence bound with everyone else to the same hier-
archal conditions, which sustains the status quo. Such a world is bound 
up with an ontology of totality: the scene is set, the script is written and 
the facts of life are given. In this regard, the concept of the distribution 
of the sensible brings to light the socially constructed nature of identity, 
and especially the idea that appearance makes some social groups disap-
pear – that they don’t have a place in the univocal order of things. What 
this means is that identity is not self-determined, but shaped by a more 
radical foundation, which is the tacit knowledge that in all cases people 
know who they are and who they are not. What this means is that to be 
an individual, to be someone different is in all cases accompanied with 
Otherness (who you are not) as the radical guarantee of authenticity. This 
is what Rancière understands as the dialectic of the distribution of the 
sensible and what ultimately guarantees its power and authority.
In this kind of world everyone also knows their place. The social world 
is squared and ruled. The essential point is not simply the clarity of things. 
It is the similarity between the order of things and the people who inhabit 
the world. The sensible world is one where orientation has both a social 
and a moral dimension. Everybody cares about what is right and wrong. 
They also care about hierarchies. There is a difference between ‘the work-
ing class’ and ‘the middle class’, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, but 
also between groups within classes. Everyone has a finely tuned sense of 
class. Your class identity means who you are, it gives a clear indication of 
what you are worth; it suggests something about you as an individual and 
your character, about your self-awareness and grasp on moral respon-
sibility for your place in the order of things. It is assumed to be an ab-
solutely reliable index for what the world needs to know about you and, 
crucially, what you should expect out of life. If you are from ‘the working 
class’ your social inferiority is already pre-determined. As a result, those 
above you are perpetually aware of your distance from people ‘like them’.
What this tells us is that the elbow room that the new bourgeoisie are 
on the lookout for in this sensible world is more than just about social 
mobility – or even celebrity. What they crave once they have made it to 
the Promised Land is recognition in the bourgeoisie, a solid validation 
of a new found status. In this regard Hanley and Louis embody a specific 
archetype. It is a sort of ‘hero’s journey’: the hero undertakes a quest to 
leave his or her appointed place and emerges in the distribution of the 
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sensible transformed and with mutual recognition from within its order 
of things. Of the many divisions in twenty-first century world – men 
versus women, insider versus outsider, gay versus straight, white versus 
black, left-wing versus right-wing, and so on – only one is immutable 
in the distribution of the sensible: the demarcation middle class versus 
working class, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. To paraphrase an 
insight from Fredric Jameson’s reading of Heidegger (cited in Banville 
2016), these two aspiring journalists not only emerge from the ‘scandal-
ous rift’ between ‘the working class’ and ‘the middle class’ – a radical 
distinction whose time would come, Marx and Engels thought, when 
there would be only two classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat – but 
indeed hold apart in tension the two sides of that ‘scandalous rift’, and 
thus open a space in which everyone is called upon to live within this 
tension and to affirm its reality.
In all her work Hanley provokes us to think again about the social in-
equality of our time, but always in a way that is related to maintaining 
the two sides of the ‘scandalous rift’:
When Britain exposed its deep divisions in last year’s [Brexit] referendum, it was 
tempting to view “leave” and “remain” voters as opposing factions in a culture war. 
Mail readers versus Guardian types; town dwellers versus city dwellers; pub-goers 
versus tapas-eaters. Tempting, yes, but too easy. Britain’s cultural divide is an ex-
pression of another, more pernicious divide that has been growing for decades, that 
of social class (Hanley 2017).
In Louis’s (2017b) grimly impoverished sensible world, culture emerg-
es from and is only for the elite. In his vision, culture is constantly on 
tap, although it rejects the working classes, who in turn reject it, using 
rebellion and dissent to fuel their own subjugation, and that of ethnic 
minorities:
Culture, the education system, books had all given us a feeling of rejection: in re-
turn, we rejected them. If culture paid us no attention, we would have our revenge. 
We despised it. It should never be said that the working classes reject culture, but 
rather that culture rejects the working classes, who reject it in turn. It should never 
be said that the working classes are violent, but rather that the working classes suf-
fer from violence on a daily basis, and because of that they reproduce this violence 
by, for example, voting for the Front National. The domination comes first; those in 
positions of dominance are always responsible.
This sense of being trapped in the working class permeates Louis’s 
account. Here the working classes are unable to break free from the gen-
erations of social and cultural baggage they are burdened with. In Bour-
dieu’s language, they can’t escape, but not just because they don’t have 
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the right social and cultural capital. One of the main social tasks of la 
police is to ensure the reproduction of class dispositions and the habituses 
most advantageous for maintaining the order of things. In other words, 
symbolic violence is one of the tools which enables la police to impose 
a cultural arbitrary as an arbitrary power – it does this by making class 
inequalities seem both natural and necessary. What Rancière’s thesis 
suggests is that without ostensibly denying anyone an iota of agency, 
the distribution of the sensible operates as a totality, in which everyone 
and every institution, exists in some relation to every other – the distri-
bution of the sensible is both a sharing and division of the world – and 
people behave according to the limits and choices they find set before 
them, more than according to whether they deviate from the norm in 
Foucault’s (1977) sense.
Yet Louis’s account offers very little that is concrete or geared to repre-
senting the social and cultural conditions under scrutiny. His interpre-
tation fails because it never interprets. It simply accepts a stereotypical 
characterization of ‘the working class’. What it does instead is lock ‘the 
working class’ into a singular, self-contained world. In so doing, what 
it fails to recognize is that ‘the poor’, in common with most other men 
and women in twenty first century societies, actually inhabit pluralized 
worlds where there are different possibilities. In the twenty-first century, 
everyone wears many hats and inhabits many worlds. It is the bourgeois 
media-sociology hybrid that wishes to lock them into a single, disadvan-
taged world. Its victims are subordinate, both in a symbolic sense (de-
monized and turned into monsters) and in a material sense (lacking the 
means of self-determination). The bourgeois media-sociology hybrid’s 
response to the result of the Brexit referendum is a crowning example 
of such an eventuality. About Brexit, it concluded from on high that in 
voting to leave Europe in their droves, the traditional (white) working 
class were not only racist but also idiotic in acting contrary to their best 
interests.
Hanley goes further, however. She develops what might be referred 
to as her own ‘pet story’, a story that provides a unifying emotional 
logic to a set of beliefs about ‘the working class’ upheld by the bour-
geois media-sociology hybrid. The story that Hanley creates for her 
audience is a parable that has its roots in Richard’s Hoggart’s (1992) 
classic study Uses of Literacy. It begins with an image of an organic 
working-class culture, whose ‘public values and private practices are 
tightly intertwined’, and which bears all the hallmarks of a folk so-
ciety that is free of the spoils of manufacture, starts to give way to 
a new mass popular culture, which displays all the ‘shiny barbarism’ 
of a ‘candy floss world’, when era had come to an end, the era when – at 
the risk of being tautologous – world and being-in-the world were of 
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two kinds: the moment when a way of life was altered and diminished 
permanently. This still looks like a cosy, contented world but if  you 
scratch beneath the surface there are all the signs that we associate 
with poverty: insecurity, uncertainty, anxiety, apathy, fatalism. But an 
even greater indignity pervades in the form of consumerism, which 
not only robs the working classes of their literacy but also their jobs. 
Meanwhile they start to find themselves reviled for their lack of social 
and cultural capital (read: ‘chavs’, ‘bogans’, and so on) but more so for 
their lack of aspiration for the leaving the world their forebears were 
once taught to honour from birth. 
In this ‘pet story’ the closing up of distance between the bourgeois 
media-sociology hybrid brought about by the social inclusion of these 
new bourgeois journalists and the world they are describing implies 
that ‘working class’ life is no longer just another story told from above. 
This way of telling we are informed provides a challenge to stereotypical 
imagery and it is supposed change perceptions. Nothing could be further 
from the truth. The overall effect is so full of its own virtuousness that 
it gives the impression of showing little regard for those about whom it 
talks, and the arch structuring the analysis – with its inability to grasp 
the existential contingency of the individual lives at stake in the com-
mentary – renders it critically inert. To paraphrase some insights from 
Jean-Paul Sartre (1947: 121 and 125): 
Eager to make a name for themselves in the bourgeois media journalists such as 
Hanley and Louis set themselves up as being, in principle, independent of any sort 
of ideology. As a result, they retain their abstract aspect of pure negativity. They do 
not understand that what they write is itself ideology; it wears itself out asserting 
its autonomy, which no one contests. This amounts to saying that it has no privi-
leged subject and can treat any matter whatever. There is no doubt about the fact 
that one might write felicitously about the condition of the working class; but the 
choice of this subject depends upon individual circumstances, upon a free decision 
of the artist.
Having found out that much, Sartre warns, but ‘the solitude of the 
artist [is] doubly a fake: it cover[s] up not only a real relationship with 
the great public but also the restoration of an audience of specialists’ 
(Ibid: 125). This is because the ultimate goal of such artistic effort is not 
really to abolish social class inequality, but to maintain it, coupled with 
the induced desire to maintain the ‘scandalous rift’ between ‘the working 
class’ and ‘the middle class’, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Having 
made her own lonely journey from the one class to the other, Hanley not 
only ‘feels a mixture of gratitude and elation to have had the chance to 
do so … I somehow got to the other side, to the place where life is easier, 
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in one piece’ (cited in Steedman 2016), but also a responsibility to uphold 
the ‘scandalous rift’.
This observation leads to a further troubling aspect of the bourgeois 
media-sociology hybrid. This is the argument that despite their claims 
to the contrary, new bourgeois journalists such as Hanley and Louis 
do a double disservice to ‘the poor’, by not only being resolutely de-
termined to ‘give voice’ to the conditions of their subjugation, but also 
by judging ‘them’ as oppressed creatures, who have not a cat in hell’s 
chance of making it ‘to the other side’. As Rancière (2004) would say, in 
the sensible world produced by the bourgeois media-sociology, there 
are no ‘thieves’, only ‘the possessors and the disposed’. One of the con-
sequences of this is that in trying to understand social inequality, the 
world of ‘the poor’ is always bound to remain partial to say the least, and 
if the bourgeois media-sociology hybrid is one that is successful in giv-
ing voice, the only voices really heard are those of the new bourgeoisie 
journalists. As that most discerning critic of this fixation with turning 
subjectivity into objectivity and converting people from subjects into 
objects of investigation, Jacques Derrida once put it, ‘One cannot say: 
‘Here are our monsters’’, without immediately turning the monsters 
into pets’ (1990: 80). 
What is perhaps most problematic with the bourgeois media-sociology 
hybrid, then, is that it ends up overstating the significance of the rela-
tionship between difference and subjugation. This constitutes the limit 
of a particular sort of thinking, for which true freedom is only that of the 
interpreter, and which is conceivable and functions as the exact opposite 
of the ostensible powerlessness of those who are subjugated. As Ran-
cière would say, here thinking ends up as the very thought of inequality 
because by posing social inequality as the primary fact that needs to be 
explained it ends up explaining its necessity.
What the bourgeois media-sociology hybrid also does in this regard 
is deny the interpretive role of thinking sociologically since its concep-
tion of reflexivity (in common with Bourdieu’s), foregrounds social 
inequality at the expense of understanding worlds through the self-
understandings of social agents. In fact, the bourgeois media-sociology 
hybrid and Bourdieu’s sociology are mirror images of each other. The 
awareness of what is lost, overlooked, and distorted in the process of 
transforming people’s everyday worlds into good copy; and what it 
shares in common with Bourdieu’s sociology, is the inability to escape 
the tendency to impose its own narrative order on all kinds of untidi-
ness – worst of all, the necessities of class theory above the identi-
fication with and compassion for those whose worlds it claims to be 
explaining – while failing miserably to reflect on the process by which 
that order has been achieved. 
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Rethinking social inequality
The argument developed in this article suggests that, in sociology and 
in the bourgeois media-sociology hybrid, ‘the poor’ (read: ‘the working 
class’) have to stay in their place: on the one hand, they have no time to 
go anywhere else because work won’t wait for them, which is an empiri-
cal fact; and on the other, their immovability rests on the belief that ‘God 
mixed iron in their makeup while he mixed gold in the makeup of those 
who are destined to deal with the common good’ (Rancière 2009: 276). 
This second reason is not an empirical fact, but it provides the alchemi-
cal myth (‘the story of the deity who mixes gold, silver, or iron in the 
souls’) that underpins the distribution of the sensible and which sustains 
the idea that ‘the poor’ – Hanley’s Sun-reading nan and granddad and 
Mirror-reading mum and dad who live on the Chelmsley Wood Estate 
she was brought up on and feature in Estates and Respectable come to 
mind – have to remain in their assigned places. In other words, in order 
for sociology to function it has to rest on the idea that the social divisions 
and the inequalities emanating from these are performed by those who 
endure them ‘as their life, as what they feel, and what they are aware of ’ 
(Ibid). To use one of Rancière’s analogies, the identity of someone from 
‘the ‘must fit like a handmade pair of shoes, but the type of shoe is never 
in question.
Obviously, Rancière doesn’t think that ‘the poor’ actually believe that 
God mixed iron in their souls and gold in the souls of those higher in the 
system of social stratification, but it is enough that they sense it and as 
a result feel obliged, responsible and actively committed to this idea as 
if it were true. In other words, for Rancière, social divisions are not only 
a reflection of actually existing conditions of existence, but also the ex-
tent to which sociologists believe that they are natural and inevitable. In 
Rancière’s scheme of things ‘myth’ and ‘reality’ and ‘activity’ and ‘passiv-
ity’ are not opposed; just as a ‘reality’ always goes along with ‘myth’, so 
‘activity’ always goes along with ‘passivity’. In other words, for Rancière, 
sociologists give their own meaning to the world through the patterns of 
hierarchy and order which appear in their theories and which they help 
to create and sustain. Indeed, ‘the poor’ not only have a fixed past but do 
not have a future as their destiny has been foretold. They have come into 
existence only with the functionalist epistemic we see them in. The world 
of ‘the poor’ is a self-enclosed universe devoid of any human mysterious-
ness. To have a fixed past and a destiny foretold means only suspension, 
not perception – the objectionable erasure of democratic narrative, or 
any formal structure that would help normalize the milieu which con-
stitute hitherto unexplained lives. In the event, sociology only ‘helps its 
users in the academic world and the open intellectual market alike to 
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maintain the pretense of critique by providing them with a means of 
reducing the manifold vertical differentiations of ‘society’ to the simple 
matrix of the privileges of power – be they… capital owners, material or 
symbolic’ (Sloterdijk 2013: 181).
Rancière (2009) argues that what sociologists need to grasp is that 
actually existing reality and the ability to transform it lies not in their 
theories but in the collective passion of individuals. What he also argues 
is that when the status quo of actually existing reality is challenged, ‘a 
break of epistemology as the qualifying perceptual criterion for political 
participation‘ (Panagia 2010: 98) takes place, which leads to a demand for 
a share, a place, a part des san-part, in the social order by those who do 
not have one. To this extent, Rancière understands politics as a form of 
disruption of the established order of things by those who challenge their 
own invisibility, silence and unimportance within that order. Here Ran-
cière is not talking about the empowerment of a group that already has 
a subordinated part or a place. Rather, that ‘politics is the emergence of 
a claim to enfranchisement by a group that has been so radically excluded 
that its inclusion demands the transformation of the rules of inclusion’ 
(Martin 2005: 39). What this suggests is that people acting politically not 
only demand to be included in the world in ways that have previously not 
been open to them, but that they are also intent on a total transformation 
of the ways in which they are seen in this new ‘part’ or role – that is, they 
are after a radical transformation of experience. In other words, in order 
for them to be included, the world has to be transformed to accommodate 
them in different ways than it has done previously, and in order for the 
world to be transformed, people acting politically need to conjure a dif-
ferent world.
The essential point I want to make here can be made by briefly discuss-
ing some of the findings from my study of the ‘Inbetweeners’, the inter-
mediary generation that provide the focus of a life history interpretation 
of working-class life in northern England in the period after the Second 
World War (Blackshaw 2013). Amongst other things, this study explores 
the extent to which a generation of working-people found through their 
leisure interests and activities the means to transform a world in which 
they had hitherto been predisposed to remain invisible. As this study 
shows, through the life course this generation would re-discover life as 
unintended and contingent and they would as a result set about re-mak-
ing new worlds in their own image, and discovering also, by extension, 
that leisure is often pivotal to these reconstructions. 
What the evidence emerging from my study suggests is that when the 
balance of work and leisure tilts over from the former to the latter, as 
it did for many working-people in England in the post-war period, the 
distribution of iron and gold is disturbed. Indeed, by stealing ‘a certain 
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sort of gold, a sort of gold which is at once more and less precious than 
the gold which is supposed to be mixed in the soul of the rulers’ (Rancière 
2009: 278), the Inbetweeners were at the vanguard of the dawn of a new 
order of things in which leisure moved steadily into its position as the 
principal driving force underpinning the human goal of satisfying its 
hunger for meaning and its thirst for giving life a purpose (Blackshaw 
2010). In other words, what the findings of this study demonstrate is that 
leisure was key to understanding the interruption of a tacitly accepted 
order of things by working-people who had hitherto been invisible in it. 
The result was, as the evidence of the study demonstrates, in the post-
war period, that leisure as a certain kind of gold, instead of being out of 
the reach of most working-people, began to take up a more central and 
radical place in their lives. 
Conclusions
Amongst all the issues that emanate from the cognitive dissonance 
found in sociology discussed in this article, the following stand out. First 
and foremost, the prevailing discourse underpinning sociologically in-
formed interpretations of class is premised upon situating ‘the poor’ in 
a singular, self-contained world. This social group figure in this world at 
the periphery, sometimes out of focus or only by omission. That is, sociol-
ogy is weak on understanding ‘the poor’ and what ‘they’ might choose do 
with their individual agency. Sociology is alert to recognizing that social 
inequality is relational and has multiple dimensions, but it does this at 
the expense of understanding that everyone today – notwithstanding 
whether they are ‘the poor’ or not – inhabit pluralized worlds where there 
are different possibilities. 
The crucial move is to identify as ‘the working class’ what turns out to 
be only some of ‘the working class’ – ‘the working class’ Hanley encoun-
tered growing up in a council house just outside Birmingham and Louis 
in his small village in the north of France. It has been demonstrated that 
class is a dangerous concept, which can turn in an instant from being an 
asset to a liability for those people on whom it is bestowed. We saw the 
bourgeois media-sociology hybrid equipping ‘the poor’ with an excess 
of the most unattractive, but also most necessary features of ‘people like 
them’ – features that while purporting to ‘give them voice’ actually turn 
them into monsters (Louis), or even worse still, pets (Hanley). 
It is important to qualify something at this point. I am not suggesting 
for a moment that social inequality is by now unimportant to sociol-
ogy. That is not my argument. Of course social inequality continues to 
have a massive bearing on people’s lives and the opportunities afforded 
to some groups are clearer very different to others. This is exactly the 
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sort of situation Miriam Pawel identifies in her study which reports the 
plight of farmworkers living in the canyons of Carlsbad north of San 
Diego in California who have to ‘burrow into the hills each year, cover-
ing their [plastic] shacks with leaves and branches to stay out of view of 
multimillion-dollar homes’ (cited in Noah 2015: 33). These farmworkers 
have to live without running water, toilets, refrigeration, yet they live 
within hearing distance of the fireworks and music from nearby LEGO-
LAND that regularly perforate the night skies. Here the juxtaposition of 
two kinds of existence – the rich at leisure and the poor having to eke out 
a subsistence existence – couldn’t be starker. 
The respective divisions between what kinds of leisure are available to 
the rich and the poor are indeed often very different. But what we need 
to recognize is that what human agency does not respect is the divisions 
placed on ‘the poor’ by sociology. My argument is that sociology too read-
ily accepts the shapes that capitalism, patriarchy, racism and convention 
have forced our lives. To understand the implications of social inequality 
we have to look at the present day context in which it takes place. Being 
‘poor’ today is radically different to being ‘poor’ in the past in the sense 
that it is experienced in a world in which contingency takes the place of 
necessity. One of the upshots of this is that old forms (read: social classes) 
that used to explain social inequality no longer provide accurate insights 
of our experiences – there is too much of a slippage between word and 
world. The truth is that today, notwithstanding our social origins, we 
expect more from life than our forebears did. We get frustrated or feel 
let down when our expectations rub up against much the same, but the 
difference in the twenty-first century is that we don’t succumb. Instead 
we stand-up and fight in order to try to shape our lives on our own terms. 
That TINA dictum, ‘There Is No Alternative’, is confronted daily by myriad 
tiny, irrepressible grenades that explode deep inside countless imagina-
tions. Some of us are better placed, and for that reason more successful 
than others in overcoming the obstacles that capitalism, consumerism, 
patriarchy, racism and convention have forced into our lives, but what-
ever cards we have been dealt we ensure that our destiny takes shape 
in a way that accords with our own sense of things. In this way we are 
able to find some agreement between what life throws at us and our own 
expectations. 
Mainstream British sociology as to date failed to recognize any of this. 
Subsequently there is now an unacceptable gap between sociological ac-
counts and quotidian experience of social inequality. This gap has arisen 
as a result of sociology’s anxious reluctance to let go of the ‘zombie cat-
egories’– zombies frighten us by being both dead and alive – associated 
with social class, which have a strange ghost-like presence sociological 
discourse, which still uses them as if they represent something, includ-
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ing power; and to some extent they do still represent power. But the social 
networks and patronage, the paddings of privilege and the stereotypes 
leftover from modernity in its ‘solid’ phase do not carry the same power 
that they once did – even if sociology carries on ‘business as usual’. 
So how to refresh sociology in a way that thinks outside social class? 
The disorderly continuity of modern life is infinitely less predictable 
and more strangely ambiguous than any sociological theory would sug-
gest. Sociologists must face up to the fact that each and every one of them 
is standing in a moral quagmire as they try to illuminate the lived life 
through their work. As such, to paraphrase Sloterdijk, we must recognize 
that as sociologists we must be prepared to be challenged where our own 
tacit assumptions are interrogated. When there is no solid ground under 
the sociological enterprise, no basis for moral certainty, the truth is that 
the only other way the authority of any work can be enhanced is through 
the acknowledgment of its predispositions.
The effects of social inequality, we can agree, continue. In this regard 
we have learned from Giddens (1984), the two-way process by which 
everyday experience is turned into sociology and sociology is turned 
into everyday experience should always be promoted by sociologists as 
a democratic activity. Any sociologist intent on revealing the effects of 
social inequality must try to ensure that they are showing us both of these 
things. There is no one theory or ‘rule of method’ in this regard; the genu-
inely reflexive sociologist will write these the way that they must write 
them. In the most compelling accounts the writing will be clear and the 
ideas will be based on things seen by the sociologist and spoken about by 
their research respondents rather than on what they think as a profes-
sional sociologist and is excited to think they now understand it all. 
Sociologists have a responsibility to complicate their interpretations 
by questioning what it is possible for them as researchers, or anyone else 
for that matter, including bourgeois journalists, to finally ‘know’ about 
other people. It is all too easy to feel and to theorize people less fortunate 
than yourself as part of a mass – or any other kind of social grouping 
vulnerable to political manipulation. It is also all too easy to disapprove of 
what that mass do in their free time. But that kind of feeling and theoriz-
ing is as foolish as the disapproving is reprehensible. To put some addi-
tional gloss on James’s (2009: 9) perceptive observations, the mass are us: 
a multitude of individuals. They just happen to be leading less fortunate 
lives. Any sociologist or journalist who speaks about social justice from 
their privileged position will not be able to do so in any compelling ways 
unless they can dispel with class ideology. In order to do this, they will 
not only have to replace this attitude with compassion – as Paul Taylor 
(2009) observed, identifying with those less privileged than yourself is 
not enough, you need to really feel their plight: ‘to identify is merely to 
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love one’s neighbour as oneself; to empathise is to love one’s neighbour 
for himself or herself ’ – but just as importantly recognize that their own 
fortune begins with their own freedom.
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